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India. However, I caution that the strict focus on imperialism has channeled Indian business history toward selected industries and time periods, while simultaneously concealing others. We know most about industries with strong British participation, Anglo-Indian trading networks, and the pre-World War I period, when Britain's economic hegemony in India was less disputed.
However, many accounts artificially isolate the British-Indian relationship from the larger global economy and either ignore other competitors or subsume them into overgeneralized concepts, such as the category "European." Comparing different imperial and extraimperial experiences, their encounters and rivalries, will allow for a more nuanced multipolar analysis of the Indian business context. Narrowly defined, Germany's own colonial history was very brief and ended abruptly in 1918, when it lost its colonies in Africa and the Pacific as a consequence of World War I.
However, the desire for colonies and a related revisionism of the colonial experience remained strong in Germany throughout the 1920s. 9 Never in its history did Germany have any formal rule on the Indian subcontinent. However, as John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson have eloquently pointed out, formal rule is only one form of imperialism-and not necessarily the most desirable. 10 Not being a formal imperial power in India did not diminish Germany's interest in this promising market. Gallagher and Robinson's famous formulation "trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary" stresses that informal control is less exclusive and may be contested over time, for example, by foreign challengers.
From the late nineteenth century onward, Germany attempted to become such an economic challenger to Great Britain, with varying success. 11 Like their counterparts from Switzerland, Japan, France, and possibly elsewhere, German businesspeople were able to present themselves as outsiders of empire, facilitating their interactions with nationalistic Indians. 12 In addition, German businesspeople over time learned that in particular their rivalry with Great
Britain in Europe was well-received in India. Indians were open to the idea of Germany as an alternative European power, which could potentially support India's economic development and political independence. After World War I the idea that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"
created an environment particularly conducive to a variety of entanglements. During both wars, this fortuitous alignment of interests led to military cooperation between the German government and different groups of Indian nationalists. 13 The business relationship between Germany and India has not yet received similar attention. 14 
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The relevance of extraimperial competitors varies starkly among different industries.
While British-Indian power struggles shaped the development of the much-discussed textile industry significantly, scholars who have focused on bazaar goods (such as sewing machines, typewriters, gramophones, and bicycles) find much more global competition. 15 For the Indian steel industry, Aparajith Ramnath also convincingly demonstrates the influence of U.S. and
German experts on the development of local industry. 16 In this article I will focus on synthetic dye manufacturing, an industry that is particularly well suited for this discussion, for two primary reasons: First, prior to World War I, German dye manufacturers enjoyed a virtual monopoly. In the interwar years the fierce struggle over foreign markets (e.g., India) exemplifies how international competition stretched into imperial markets, where the political economy allowed for it. Second, during the war and interwar years, manufacturers in the dyestuff industry engaged in multiple forms of collaboration typical for this time period. 17 These industry agreements make research "beyond the nation state," as is often claimed in transnational history, or beyond the boundaries of empire, necessary. 18 The dyestuff industry is of great significance to the Indian economy because it supplied the textile industry, which was growing quickly and was central to emerging debates on Indian nationalism. Surprisingly, the extensive monographs on German dye companies only mention India as the largest export market for dyes after World War I (together with China) but do not provide any detail on business practices or local market challenges.
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Adding the German perspective has the practical advantage of making new sources available to scholars of Indian business history. 20 The primary sources for this article come from Farben (hereafter, I.G. Farben), created by a merger of these major German dye manufacturers, organized the India business of these companies jointly.
German Dyes in India before World War I
The production and use of dyestuffs is an ancient art. Archaeological evidence shows that in India dyeing was a widespread activity as early as the third millennium BCE. Dye substances included plant juices and animal and mineral substances. The most commonly used dyes were madder, lac, cochineal, and kermes for producing red; turmeric, safflower, saffron, and mineral orpiment for yellow; indigo for blue; and gall black for black. 22 Industrially produced dyes entered the market in the mid-nineteenth century. In the late 1850s, aniline dyes, derived from coal tar, first became available. The German chemical industry was a first mover in the business of synthesizing the colorants of the main natural dyes. Around 1870, it began offering synthesized alizarin, the colorant of the important red dyestuff madder, and from the 1890s it also offered synthesized indigo from aromatic hydrocarbons. 23 Synthetic dyes increasingly replaced the majority of natural dyes. However, the eventual success of artificial dyes cannot be explained by price differences alone, as historian Alexander Engel argues, because these were negligible prior to World War I. Instead, artificial dyes allowed for a greater standardization of the dyeing result and a greater variety of dyes, and the manufacturers had a superior distribution model. 24 For indigo in particular, the transition from natural to artificial dyes equaled a reversal of previous trade structures: natural indigo in the nineteenth century originated primarily in India and was brought to market by British planters. With the change to synthetic indigo, India lost its position as a major exporter to Germany. 25 Three-fourths of all synthetic dyes originated within Germany just before World War I; another eighth were made using intermediates imported from Germany, so that an estimated 88 percent of world production was ultimately controlled by Germany. 26 German manufacturers profited from a supportive environment, including a welldeveloped system of higher education in chemistry, an abundant supply of the raw material coal, a system of industrial laboratories supporting the development of patentable products, and a patent law that protected only production processes and not particular goods, thus promoting innovation more effectively than French or British legislation. 27 For the German dye industry, India was the fifth-largest market by weight-after the United States, China, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary-and the fourth-largest market by value, after China, Great Britain, and the United States (Table 1) . 28 The British-Indian statistics
show that about three-fourths of all imported synthetic dyes came from Germany. Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland supplied the remainder, sometimes through re-exports. 29 The majority of the imports were cotton dyes for the large cotton mills. Most dye imports went to the harbor of Bombay (now Mumbai), which was the chief distributing center for the trade due to the large number of cotton mills in the Bombay Presidency. 30 The major German players in the synthetic dyestuff industry were Bayer (founded in 1863), Hoechst (also 1863), and BASF (1865). to RM 2,451,647 (approximately US$76,274 to US$584,004), generated in a total of sixteen offices. 38 The other German dye manufacturers showed similarly positive results in the decade prior to World War I and increased their dye exports to India (as well as China) by leaps and bounds. 39 The business success of the German dyestuff manufacturers was the result of their monopolistic position. A well-functioning sales organization and early contacts with local scientists and traders added to the firms' good standing in India. All larger German dye manufacturers had their main depots with laboratories and technical staff in Bombay as well as smaller depots in the important dyestuff-selling cities. The dyestuffs were shipped in bulk and 8 then diluted to the required strengths in Bombay. The German manufacturers also invested in training and developed local salesmen and demonstrators. 40 These localization efforts were appreciated by Indian buyers, particularly in the context of the increasingly politicized textile industry.
In the textile industry, the early Indian independence movement and the struggle for industrial self-reliance became influential around the turn of the century. The nationalist swadeshi movement-swadeshi meaning "of/from one's own country"-called on Indians to consume indigenous goods rather than imported ones, claiming that foreign imports stalled the national economic development. Swadeshi ideas had circulated for a while but the movement experienced a major push in the wake of the campaign against the partition of Bengal province that began in 1903. 41 The Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, decided to partition Bengal, which he allegedly considered too large for effective governance. Lord Curzon's plans were met with deep resentment because they were seen as restraining the growing power of articulate Bengali
Hindus. 42 The growing nationalistic sentiment, first in Bengal, then throughout the country, 
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With the outbreak of the war, the total import of dyes into India fell abruptly to one-third of prewar amounts. 53 Those dyes remaining in the country, or making their way there during the war, were sold at auction. While in most industries British, American, and Japanese competitors quickly filled in the voids that the Germans had left, they did not have the production capacity to meet the demand for dyes. 54 By 1916, the scarcity was so acute that prices increased sharply. 55 In Cawnpore, the shortage of dyes was obvious to even the casual observer "by the remarkable absence during the recent Holi festival of colour throwing," a custom for which dry powder and colored water were traditionally used. 56 Over the following years, Germany's competitors supplied increasingly greater quantities of dyestuffs. While the German manufacturers had provided their dyes to both textile mills and bazaars, the late movers followed a division of labor: British dyes were sold primarily to factories, while American and to a lesser extent Japanese dyes went to the bazaar segment. Britain and France. 59 However, the industrial capacity of Germany's chemical industry remained 11 largely intact and many of the wartime products found peacetime applications-as intermediates in dye production, among others. 60 In India, after the end of the war, many Indians expected Britain to reward them for their loyalty with a greater voice in their own government. When this did not happen, members of the Indian National Congress (INC), the predominant public organization of independence activists, demanded that President Wilson's principle of self-determination be applied to India. 61 In the aftermath of Versailles, India became a member of the League of Nations; however, those who hoped that this "external self-determination" would eventually lead to "internal self- To circumvent the travel restrictions, German dye manufacturers also reverted to "cloaking," i.e., disguising German ownership of firms and commercial transactions. 67 Dyes remained scarce in the first half of the 1920s, but after the occupation of the Ruhr region by the French in 1923, production once again increased, eventually leading to an oversupply. 75 All dye-producing countries manufactured more dyes than their home markets required. They also established protective barriers, including tariffs, subsidies, and privileges for national producers, which allowed the home industry to fulfill the lion's share of internal demand. As a result all manufacturers competed keenly for the accessible export markets, most importantly for the nonproducing countries China and India. 76 In India, the German dye firms regained their lost market share quickly, not least due to their increased production capacity and well-functioning organization. The business remained split into factory and bazaar segments; the factory business was done in selected large centers, where the majority of the cotton mills were located, such as Bombay, Ahmedabad, Cawnpore, Calcutta, and Bangalore. Mills bought primarily sulphur black for coarse cloth, and the majority operated in-house dyeing departments. In Bombay, they also sometimes outsourced the dyeing process to contractors. Havero sold dyes directly to the mills or their contractors and to that end visited the factories regularly. 77 Due to the close contact with these large customers and a better understanding of their needs, Havero managed to successfully introduce the I.G. Farben's more expensive fast colors, a market that was growing quickly. 78 In the bazaar trade, Havero (representing I.G. Farben) marketed its dyes through sixteen Indian distributors. The dyes were delivered on consignment but for a cash deposit, on which the distributor received a monthly interest of 6 percent. Sales prices were fixed by Havero, and the sellers received commissions and reported their sales on a daily basis. Prior to the collaboration in the I.G., each German firm had employed its own distributors, with long-term agreements 14 making them unavailable to competitors. Consequently, there was a significant overlap between the regional responsibilities and no seller had exclusive rights to any territory. Visiting India, Carl Duisberg, chairman of the supervisory board of I.G. Farben, remarked that "most of them are rich orthodox merchants with little knowledge of dyes." 79 Controlling the Indian distributors in the bazaar segment was almost impossible and created a series of principal-agent conflicts, frequently based on the generous discounts that distributors gave in the competitive market space.
The Indian distributors sold the dyes in one-or half-pound tins to both end consumers and intermediaries, with the latter reselling the product out of open tins in extremely small quantities, often measured in spoons. The colors were diluted so that a minimum purchase of half a pound was affordable. Larger quantities, up to 112 pounds, could be sold to local dye houses.
Trademarks-pictorial labels in particular-were very valuable in the multilingual Indian context with its high rates of illiteracy. The Dutch Havero assigned great importance to the various trademarks of the I.G. firms but also, remarkably, saw much value in the label "Made in Germany," which, according to leading managers, was recognized and appreciated. 80 Similarly, the German consul in India observed "great sympathy for German products," while the Foreign
Office in Berlin heard with interest about a Bombay trader of machinery whose fixtures were rejected in a factory in Ahmedabad because they were not visibly marked "Made in Germany." piece goods were ubiquitous in those years. 83 The German Foreign Office observed the development closely; it encouraged German firms to be sensitive to Indian sentiments and to avoid any racial tactlessness, such as calling Indian trading partners "natives," a label considered pejorative. 84 In a confidential report of 1930, a Foreign Office official opined that anti-British 15 sentiment could be expected to persist given the collision of the "racial arrogance of the English"
with the newfound confidence of the Indian population. existing taxes. Import duties on a number of products were increased; an import duty on dyes was suggested for the first time but heavily criticized. Mill owners insisted that raw materials and machinery, needed for the development of India's own industry, should be allowed into the country without restrictions and from any foreign country. 88 The Taxation Act of 1934 nevertheless introduced a 10 percent tax on dyes, applicable to all foreign dyes, from both within and outside the British Empire. 89 Since there was no domestic dye industry, the tax did not change the competitive dynamics between the foreign manufacturers. International monetary policy, however, did. In 1931, the British pound departed from the gold standard, while the Reichsmark remained linked to gold. Consequently, the Indian rupee depreciated relative to the Reichsmark, making exports less profitable. The German government, in desperate need of foreign currency exchange, expanded its export subsidies and increased state control of imports and exports. 90 Finally, implementation of the cartel was not without challenges. While the place of supply rules could easily be implemented in the mill business, I.G. Farben had less control over the bazaar business, which involved all cartel firms via large Indian merchants. It was therefore necessary to make arrangements for local cartels. From 1931 onward, the firms of the cartel met weekly to discuss the implementation of the cartel agreements in India. By 1938, they had agreed on rigid local conditions, including minimum net prices, terms of sales, the maximum number of local distributors, and the maximum commission to be granted to them (between 7.5 and 12 percent, depending on the product). However, making sure the theoretical guidelines were followed in the Indian bazaar segment remained difficult.
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India and Nazi Germany
Thanks to the cartel agreement and local negotiations, I.G. Farben continued to increase its profits in India ( Table 2 ). The firm profited from its established trademarks, which Havero actively pushed throughout the 1930s, while other cartel firms were content to supply their dyes in bulk and have them repackaged and rebranded by the approximately 150 local "mixers/packagers" throughout the country. 92 The rise to power of the Nazis in 1933 did not at first cause major disruptions in German-Indian business relations; however, Adolf Hitler frequently and publicly expressed his disapproval of the Indian independence movement. Select
Indian industrialists voiced their concerns about this to German business partners, who tried to downplay Hitler's comments. despite pockets of resistance and fear that Gandhi's hostility towards modern industry might be reflected in politics. 94 Despite diverging opinions within the INC, however, it was obvious to the German observers that greater Indian participation in both politics and economics was not only inevitable but also potentially beneficial to Germany.
In 1937-1938, Anton Reithinger, chief of I.G. Farben's Macroeconomic Department, met with Indian nationalists, Indian industrialists, and British administrators in India. Reithinger observed with delight that both British and Indian elites were favorable to India's economic development-the former to secure peace, the latter to achieve independence-so that Germans would not be forced to pick sides. In both Bengal and the United Provinces, he observed that in Indian hands." Gandhi declared he had no objection to foreign capital or labor that was "used in the interests of India" and under Indian control. 97 The German managers determined that it would be impossible for them to fulfill these criteria fully. However, they banked on a more The international diversity of this workforce was a conscious choice and a strategy intended to mitigate political risks and circumvent potential nationality-based restrictions. 100 The Nazi
Foreign Organization requested the firing of all Jewish employees and proof of "Aryan" descent for all others. I.G. Farben hesitated, knowing this policy would have consequences for its image in India. 101 There was a significant Jewish population in the country, largely concentrated in the Bombay Presidency, where I.G. conducted most of its business. 102 The Nazi regime had been a frequent topic in the Indian press since 1933, where it received both criticism and support. Some
Indian journalists defended the Nazi racial policies; some even highlighted the alleged joint heritage of Germans and Indians in an ill-defined "Aryan" community. 103 Germany's latest laws against Jews had been so negative that an official request for any such proof would only make the position of German firms more difficult. 109 This statement by Urchs, who was a known Nazi supporter, showed greater concern for commercial success than for racial policy.
World War II, which began on September 1, 1939, abruptly ended German business activity in India. Approximately six hundred German men, primarily businesspeople and missionaries, were confined in Indian internment camps. 110 German assets were once again expropriated and all Indian workers let go. Colonial intelligence reports noted that German firms showed their Indian employees great respect and compensated them generously for losing their jobs. "They [the Indian employees] are consequently inclined to regard the Nazi regime with favour and to speak well of it among their friends, a fact which has propaganda value," claimed one colonial intelligence report. 111 Nazi propaganda was widespread in India just before and during World War II and generally a concern to British intelligence. Germany organized radio broadcasts in India in twenty-two languages. After December 1940 the frequency was increased to at least one fifteen-minute broadcast daily. 112 While the German government once again increased political cooperation with Indian nationalists, most notably Subhas Chandra Bose, the German companies focused their attention on supporting their employees in Indian internment and planning a potential postwar reentry into India, when they hoped to once again count on Indian cooperation. products. While the importance of the textile industry in the Indian context is uncontested, scholars have so far had little to say about dyes, not least because they do not fit into the dominant narrative of imperial history, which is first and foremost a British-Indian history.
Thirdly, beginning in the interwar years, the dyestuff industry engaged in multiple forms of collaboration and industry agreements, which regulated a significant part of the dye import into India. These agreements, which are independent of the economic relationships within the British Empire, make it necessary to look beyond the political unit toward competitive dynamics in global trade.
The case of German dyes also highlights some of the challenges of building a business in India. Principal-agent problems with local intermediaries, marketing, and the lack of local knowledge and connections in India were all obstacles for business. In addition to these challenges, typical for internationally active companies, home-country politics also strained the crucial relationship with Indians. Germany's choice to keep its currency pegged to gold, while the British pound and the Indian rupee left the gold standard, made exports less profitable.
Moreover, Nazi policy after 1933 forced German businesspeople into a defensive position, in particular concerning their position on race. Though trying to maintain an air of neutrality, managers experienced the German government's increasing involvement in day-to-day business, and their pushback was hesitant at best. In the highly politicized context of interwar India, managing home-and host-country politics, including questions of race and nationality, moved up on the agenda of the dye companies, and their eagerly guarded neutrality towards India's independence movement was increasingly contested.
World War II and the expropriation of German business in India, similar to the events during World War I, yet again put a temporary end to the German-Indian business relationship.
German chemical companies returned to the Indian market in the 1950s. The three major
German dye companies-Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst-again worked together in Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., founded in 1960 in cooperation with the government of India, which owned 70 percent of the business. However, the project was short lived; the Germans stopped working on it in 1962. Bayer continued selling dyes and chemical products to India, but research has yet to establish how much continuity from the prewar business existed.
In conclusion, the German dye business confirms the claim that British India's openness to trade created opportunities for outsiders. In line with the most current research on Swiss and
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Japanese business interests in Asia, German firms were exploring India as a market and dominated the important dye business in the country. These German-Indian encounters are at odds with what has been called a Eurocentric perspective on India's economic development. This
Eurocentric perspective in fact refers primarily to British and to a lesser extent Dutch interests in the region and is often plotted as an alternative to regional, intra-Asian economic linkages. The evidence in this article, however, suggests that the German experience may be more fittingly described in comparison with Japan. As late industrializers and outsiders of the colonial system, both Japan and Germany offered an alternative to the British. Both German and Japanese firms were able to take advantage of their status as late industrializers benefiting from the precedent set by Great Britain. Both offered an alternative path to development-one that was attractive to
Indians because it provided access to much-needed resources and simultaneously responded to increasing nationalism in the region. Further comparative research is required to identify similarities and differences between the strategies of the two countries and to understand timeand industry-specific developments.
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